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State and Local Government 
by Daryl J. McKinstry* 
Municipal Corporations 
Legislative Authority 
Does the publisher of a newspaper have a right under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution to place a newspaper on private premises without the 
consent of the residents? Pacific Grove's city council did not 
think so; the reason advanced was that a collection of news-
papers on the property of an absent owner might tend to 
attract persons with dissolute or criminal propensities. The 
court in Di Lorenzo v. City ot Pacific Grovel expressed its 
agreement by upholding the council's ordinance prohibiting 
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School of Law. County Counsel, 
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1. 260 Cal. App.2d 68, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
3 (1968). For a further discussion of 
this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW. 
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such unsolicited newspaper deliveries. Although the court 
conceded that the ordinance could not prohibit deliveries to 
which an occupant consented, it held that the ordinance did 
not violate any constitutional rights of the distributor, since 
it was narrowly drawn to prevent a specific evil which the 
council found to exist. 
In another case dealing with newspapers, Long v. City of 
Anaheim,2 the court decided that the newspaper Weekly People 
was a non-commerical, non-profit, purely political publication 
under the court's interpretation of the ordinances of Anaheim 
and Garden Grove and that the publication thus came under 
exemptions of non-profit organizations contained in the ordi-
nance. 
A city council has the duty of setting salaries of municipal 
employees. While the legislative body must resolve the funda-
mental issues as to such matters, the court in Kugler v. Yocum3 
held that established legislation is not rendered invalid as 
an unlawful delegation of power merely because some other 
entity, private or governmental, performs a role in application 
or implementation of the enactment. A proposed ordinance 
of the City of Alhambra, in the form of an initiative measure, 
provided that its firemen be entitled to receive as a minimum 
salary the average salary among members of the fire depart-
ments of the City and County of Los Angeles. The court 
found that this ordinance would not if enacted unlawfully 
delegate the power to fix future minimum salaries for Alham-
bra's firemen to the legislative bodies of the City and County 
of Los Angeles. 
In People v. Mason/ the court held that, since sections 
330.5 and 330(b) of the Penal Code exempt from state 
regulation pinball machines that are predominantly games of 
skill, a local ordinance making possession of a pinball machine 
illegal is valid if the machine qualifies as a game of skill. 
Whether or not a particular machine so qualifies is a factual 
2. 255 Cal. App.2d 191,63 Cal. Rptr. 4. 261 Cal. App.2d 348, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
56 (1967). 17 (1968). 
3. 69 Cal.2d 371, 71 Cal. Rptr. 687, 
445 P.2d 303 (1968). 
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determination to be made in each case. 5 The appellant con-
tended that because the state legislation exempts such machines 
its intent was to make their possession legal, and that any 
attempt by the City of Santa Fe Springs to regulate them vio-
lates the California Constitution. The court concluded that 
the legislative scheme was not intended to encompass all types 
of pinball machines and that machines not included are sub-
ject to local legislation. 
Conflict of Interests 
In Millbrae Association for Residential Survival v. City of 
Millbrae,6 dealing primarily with procedural steps in rezoning 
lands under provisions of the Government Code,7 the court 
was faced with an alleged conflict of interest prohibited by the 
Code.s This section prohibits certain officers and employees 
from being interested in contracts made in their official capac-
ity. The court stressed the importance of broadly constru-
ing the word "made" to encompass such embodiments as 
preliminary discussions, negotiations, compromises, reasoning, 
planning, the drawing of plans and specifications, and the 
solicitation of bids. The court stated that no evidence was 
found that the city engineer, the employee in question, ever 
participated officially in the making of any of the contracts 
in dispute. Additionally, the court said it was unnecessary 
to show fraud or dishonesty for invalidating contracts coming 
within this section. 
In Gonsalves v. City of Dairy Valley, 9 the city council 
granted a special use permit to a dairymen's cooperative to 
allow the stockpiling of fertilizer. Each of the five city 
councilmen were stockholders in the cooperative. The court 
pointed out that although an action by an administrative body 
that is arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent is void and subject 
to annulment, the fact that the councilmen owned stock in 
5. See Knowles v. O'Connor, 266 
Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 879 
(1968). 
6. 262 Cal. App.2d 222, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 251 (1968). 
7. Gov. Code §§ 65800-65805. 
8. Gov. Code § 1090. 
9. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
255 (1968). 
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the applicant cooperative did not render their action arbitrary, 
capricious or fraudulent. It is well settled that where an ad-
ministrative body has the duty to act upon a matter before it 
and is the only entity capable to act upon it, the members' per-
sonal interest does not disqualify them from performing their 
duty.lo [No discussion of section 1090 of the Government 
Code arose since no argument was made that the special use 
permit constituted a contract.] 
Retirement and Pension 
Cases concerning retirement and pensions of public em-
ployees often deal merely with statutory construction of pro-
visions relating to such matters in charters or ordinances. 
These cases are not considered important. The general rule 
is that pension provisions must be liberally construed in favor 
of the persons benefited by them. 
The court in Pathe v. City of Bakersfieldll decided that 
a city is authorized to retire an employee found to be physically 
or mentally incapacitated for the performance of duty, not-
withstanding an Industrial Accident Commission finding that 
the employees suffered from no service-connected disability. 
It is well settled that where a city charter provision relating to 
retirement compensation conflicts with the compensation sec-
tions of the Labor Code, the Code sections must prevail. In 
Pathe, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Commission 
overlapped the subject matter jurisdiction of the city pension 
board on the single issue of whether or not an injury or dis-
ability was service connected. But the court held that the 
pension board did not lose its inherent power to retire a city 
employee found to be incapacitated for the performance of his 
duty simply because the Industrial Accident Commission de-
termined that the injury was not service connected. The 
rationale of the decision was that a charter provision allowing 
the city to retire an employee so incapacitated and a deter-
mination of whether or not the disability is service connected 
do not invade the province of the Workmen's Compensation 
10. See Barnett v. Brizee, 258 Cal. 11. 255 Cal. App.2d 409, 63 Cal. 
App.2d 97, 65 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1968). Rptr. 220 (1967). 
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Law; the charter provIsIon may merely add compensation 
benefits to employees who are compelled to retire for service 
connected disabilities. 
The assignability of retirement funds was considered in 
City of San Jose v. Forsythe. 12 A section of the municipal 
code stated that money in an employee's retirement fund was 
unassignable. An employee had given a power of attorney to 
the county credit union in order to borrow money from the 
union. After the borrower had left city employment, the credit 
union demanded the accumulated contributions in his re-
tirement fund. The court held that the credit union was not 
entitled to the money in the fundI3 because California lawI4 
favors the enforcement of regulations protecting retirement 
benefits from the claims of creditors. 
Counties 
County Service Areas 
The question presented in Byers v. Board of SupervisorsI5 
was whether the maintenance and operation of a television 
translator station was authorized under the provisions of the 
County Service Area Law found in sections 25210.1 et seq. 
of the Government Code. Since the operation and main-
tenance of a television translator station is not expr~S$ly 
provided for in the County Service Area Law, the court had to 
decide whether or not such a function would qualify as an 
"extended service" that the county would be authorized by law 
to perform. IS The county argued that establishment of the 
county service area was a legislative act, not to be disturbed 
by the court. The court cited Marbury v. Madison/7 in which 
12. 261 Cal. App.2d 114, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 754 (1968). 
13. Compare McDaniel v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 259 Cal. App. 
2d 356, 66 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1968), where 
it was held that funds in a retirement 
system claimed by an employee after 
suspension could be attached and paid 
into court. 
14. See Thomas v. Thomas, 192 Cal. 
App.2d 771, 13 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1961). 
See also Lande v. lurisich, 59 Cal. App. 
2d 613. 139 P.2d 657 (1943). 
15. 262 Cal. App.2d 148. 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 549 (1968). For a further dis-
cllssion of this case. see Friedenthal. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
16. See Gov. Code § 25210.4(d). 
17. 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137. 2 L.Ed. 
60 (1803). 
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Mr. Justice Marshall contended that a legislature's act is void 
if it is beyond the legislature's power and that the judiciary is 
bound to uphold the limited grant of power by disregarding 
the legislative act. Finding no law authorizing the county to 
provide television translator service, the court in Byers said 
that if the board of supervisors is to be granted power to create 
districts for television translator stations, the state legislature 
should make this grant in specific terms. 
Secret Meeting Law 
Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board 
of Supervisors18 contains a comprehensive analysis of the 
provisions of the Brown Act, found in sections 54950 et seq. 
of the Government Code. The decision is particularly im-
portant to attorneys representing public agencies because the 
court discussed the possible conflict of the provisions of the 
Brown Act with the attorney-client privilege under the Evi-
dence Code. 
The controversy in Sacramento Newspaper Guild centered 
upon a preliminary injunction restraining the Sacramento 
County Board of Supervisors and its committees from holding 
any closed meetings at which three or more members were 
present (provided the statutory exceptions for personnel and 
national security matters as set forth in the Government Code 
did not apply). Provoking the injunction was a luncheon 
meeting of five supervisors, the county counsel, the county , 
executive, the county director of welfare, and several union 
members. The subject of discussion was a strike by the social 
workers union against the county and the effort by the county 
to enforce an injunction pertaining to the strike. Newspaper 
reporters were denied admission. 
The decision settled an important question-does the Brown 
Act apply only to formal meetings of a public body held for 
the transaction of official business or does it also apply to in-
formal meetings? In Adler v. City Council of Culver City,19 
it was held that the Brown Act did not apply to informal 
18. 263 Cal. App.2d 41, 69 Cal. 19. 184 Cal. App.2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 480 (1968). 805 (1960). 
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meetings. Although the Attorney General had issued an opin-
ion20 stating that the 1961 amendments to the Brown Act 
nullified the Adler decision, the court in Sacramento News-
paper Guild resolved any doubt by expressly overruling Adler. 
It pointed out that section 54950 declares that deliberation as 
well as action must occur openly and publicly and that de-
liberation connotes not only collective discussion, but also the 
collective acquisition and exchange of facts preliminary to 
the ultimate decision. Thus, the term "meeting" construed 
in light of the Brown Act's objectives extends to informal dis-
cussions and conferences of board members designed for the 
discussion of business. Concluding that the luncheon meet-
ing in this case was such a meeting, the court upheld the 
injunction. 
Significantly, the court stated that the attorney-client privi-
lege l was not abrogated by the Brown Act. To reach this 
conclusion the court had to reconcile provisions of the Brown 
Act demanding open meetings and those of the Evidence Code 
assuring confidential lawyer-client communications. The 
court recognized that these statutes manifest separate policies 
and, also, that neither expressly refers to the other as con-
trolling. Nevertheless, the court had to answer the question 
whether the language of the Brown Act impliedly superseded 
the attorney-client privilege, since the Act was passed sub-
sequent to the statutory recognition of the privilege. In 
resolving this issue, the court pointed out that the policy under-
lying the attorney-client privilege is as meaningful and as 
financially important to public clients as it is to private ones. 
The court concluded that the Act did not abolish the oppor-
tunity of boards of supervisors to confer privately with their 
attorneys on occasions properly requiring confidentiality, but 
it warned that the privilege should not be expanded beyond 
its proper scope to avoid public meetings. In keeping with 
its conclusion, the appellate court modified the trial court's 
injunction to allow closed meetings when the attorney-client 
privilege obtains. 
20. 32 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 240, 242. 1. See Cal. Evid. Code § 952. 
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Grand Jury 
In Board of Trustees of Calaveras School District v. Leach,2 
the question before the court was whether or not a grand jury 
is entitled to inspect the personnel records of a school district 
pursuant to an inquiry other than the willful or corrupt mis-
conduct of any public officer. The grand jury relied upon 
section 933.5 of the Penal Code which provides, "[AJ grand 
jury may at any time examine the books and records of any 
special purpose assessment or taxing district located wholly 
ot partly in the county". The court held that the grand jury 
~s· not entitled to examine the school district's personnel 
tecotds because section 933.5 limits the grand jury's investi-
gatfqn to only the financial affairs of a district when it investi-
gatefmatters other than public offenses or misconduct. 
Legislative Authority 
In Cooper v. Michael,a the court examined a county ordi-
nance requiring auctioneers to obtain a business license. After 
noting that section 16100 of the Business and Professions 
Code authorizes a board of supervisors to license any kind 
of lawful business only for the purpose of regulating it, the 
court held that the ordinance's purpose was to raise revenue, 
not to regulate conduct, and that the ordinance therefore 
violated section 16100. (This statutory prohibition does not 
extend to cities.) 
Care of Prisoners 
Where an arrest is made by a city police officer of a person 
charged with murder and the accused requires medical atten-
tion, who has the obligation to pay for the medical treatment? 
This was the question in Washington Township Hospital 
District v. County of Alameda.4 The person arrested was 
taken by a police officer to plaintiff hospital for medical treat-
2. 258 Cal. App.2d 281, 65 Cal. Rptr. 4. 263 Cal. App.2d 272, 69 Cal. 
588 (1968). Rptr. 442 (1968). 
3. 257 Cal. App.2d 176, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 842 (1967). 
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ment and was later transferred to Alameda County Hospital. 
Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief on the ground 
that the county was liable for the cost of the accused's medical 
treatment. In construing section 29602 of the Government 
Code,S the court held that the county was liable for its emer-
gency treatment of the prisoner since this treatment constituted 
"other services," in relation to criminal proceedings brought 
by the county, for which no compensation was prescribed 
by law. 
Employee Relations 
Schools and School Districts 
In Board of Trustees v. Porini,6 the court held that when 
suspension and notice of intention to dismiss are based upon 
incompetency due to a mental disability, the school district 
must prove that the teacher is incompetent at the time of trial. 
Although the court found that there was substantial evidence 
showing that the teacher was mentally disabled at the time 
she was suspended, the evidence was insufficient to show that 
the teacher was incompetent at the time of trial. Appellant 
had last consulted with respondent's psychiatrist 13 months 
before trial, and for this reason the respondent could not 
offer evidence of any change in the appellant's mental condi-
tion. However, the appellant had been seeing her own psy-
chiatrist for some months prior to the time of trial, and 
was able to introduce evidence of her continued improvement 
based on current observations. 
The court stated that the school district must show either 
that the disability was permanent or that it had lasted over 
two years. The lesser showing is permitted by Education Code 
5. § 29602. Expenses of support of 
persons committed to county jail, re-
habilitative programs, and other serv-
ices relating to criminal proceedings. 
The expenses necessarily incurred in 
the support of persons charged with or 
convicted of crime and committed to 
the county jail and the maintenance 
therein and in other county adult de-
tension facilities of a program of re-
habilitative services in the fields of 
training, employment, recreation, and 
prerelease activities, and for other serv-
ices in relation to criminal proceedings 
for which no specific compensation is 
prescribed by law are county charges. 
6. 263 Cal. App.2d 784, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 73 (1968). 
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section 13437,7 which allows a two-year leave of absence in 
lieu of dismissal. In addition, the court noted that where 
the judgment grants a leave of absence, the school board has 
the burden of proving continued incompetency at the end of 
the two-year period in order to obtain the dismissal of a 
teacher. Finally, the court held that the statutory prohibi-
tions against giving a teacher a notice of dismissal between 
May 15 and September 158 does not apply where the law 
authorizes suspension of a teacher as a prelude to dismissal. 
In Hutton v. Pasadena City Schools,9 a school custodian 
was suspended without pay after being charged with child 
molesting. He was dismissed after his conviction, but the 
conviction was reversed and he was found not guilty at a 
new trial. The superintendent of the school district sent the 
custodian a letter expressing a willingness to pay him for the 
period of this suspension if the district was authorized to do 
so. To determine the district's authorization, the custodian 
brought an action for declaratory relief. The court conceded 
that the district had the authority, in adopting its rules and 
regulations concerning benefits of classified personnel, to allow 
such a payment; but since there was no such rule in force 
when the employee was suspended, the school district could 
not now adopt a rule applying retroactively to him. To do 
so, the court said, would be making a gift of public money, 
contrary to the California Constitution.10 
Cities and Counties 
The legislature amended sections 3500 et seq. of the Gov-
ernment Code, effective January 1, 1969. It is anticipated 
7. § 13437. Leave of absence due to 
incompetency. 
If the cause is incompetency due to 
physical or mental disability, in lieu of 
dismissal the judgment may require the 
employee to take a leave of absence for 
only such period as may be necessary 
for rehabilitation from the incompe-
tency. The leave of absence shall not 
exceed two years. During the leave of 
absence, the employee shall be entitled 
174 CAL LAW 1969 
to the benefits authorized by this code 
to employees of school districts absent 
from their duties on account of sick-
ness. 
8. See Cal. Ed. Code § 13405; See 
also §§ 13408, 13410. 
9. 261 Cal. App.2d 586, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 103 (1968). 
10. See California Constitution, Ar-
ticle XIII, Section 25. 
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that the amendments will have a significant impact upon rela-
tionships between public employees and public agencies. 
Basically, these changes require public agencies to confer in 
good faith with representatives of recognized employee 
organizations and to fully disclose to employees matters 
respecting wages, hours, and other terms of employment. 
Planning and Zoning 
Billboards and Outdoor Advertising 
Billboards and esthetics as well as the Outdoor Advertising 
Actll were considered in Desert Outdoor Advertising v. County 
of San Bernardino. 12 The court cited County of Santa Barbara 
v. Purcell, Inc./3 holding that the presence of billboards along 
a highway could reasonably be believed to have an adverse 
effect on the economy of a county. Therefore, billboards may 
be controlled by ordinance, notwithstanding the fact that 
control of billboards is based, in part, upon esthetic consid-
erations. In Desert Outdoor Advertising, there was evidence 
that the lack of billboards along freeways not only kept the 
county beautiful but also attracted tourists and industries to 
the country, thus conferring economic benefit. According to 
the court, the evidence was sufficient to put the case within 
the rule of County of Santa Barbara v. Purcell. The court 
also held that the Outdoor Advertising Act has not preempted 
the field as to all aspects of outdoor advertising in unincorpo-
rated county areas: counties still have the power to regulate 
billboards and outdoor advertising by zoning ordinances.14 
In West Coast Advertising Company v. City & County of 
San Francisco/5 petitioner sought approval from the city zon-
ing administrator to erect a billboard on his property, which 
was adjacent to a freeway. The application for a permit was 
denied and the petitioner appealed to the Board of Permit 
11. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 13. 251 Cal. App.2d 169, 59 Cal. 
5200 et seq. Rptr. 345 (1967). 
12. 255 Cal. App.2d 765, 63 Cal. 14. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
Rptr. 543 (1967), app. dismd. 393 U.S. § 5227. 
8, 21 L.Ed.2d 10, 89 S.Ct. 45. 15. 256 Cal. App.2d 357, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 94 (1967). 
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Appeals, which overruled the zoning administrator. When 
the latter refused to comply with the board's order, the peti-
tioner filed an application for a writ of mandate. 
At the hearing on the application, all parties knew the city 
was considering an ordinance that would prohibit billboards 
on property adjacent to freeways. The lower court granted 
the writ of mandate. However, on the following day the 
proposed new ordinance was signed. Petitioner contended 
that the writ was properly issued since the new ordinance did 
not become effective until thirty days after the court below 
entered its order and that he therefore had a vested right 
in the building permit. 
In ruling against the petitioner, the appellate court pointed 
out that even a permit which has received administrative 
finality can be revoked on the basis of a subsequent change 
in the zoning laws and that the permittee is immune from 
such retroactive application only if he constructs a substantial 
portion of the structure, as authorized by the permit, in good 
faith reliance upon prior law. In this case, there was no 
evidence that any substantial construction had been com-
menced; in fact, the permit had not even been issued. 
Variances and Conditional Use Permits 
In Tush v. Board of Supervisors/6 the court affirmed the 
well settled rule that where specific findings are necessary to 
support the grant of a conditional use permit or variance, the 
findings must be recited in the ultimate decision of the gov-
erning body. 
In Moss v. Board of Zoning Adjustment,l7 respondents 
owned a three-acre parcel that was zoned for residential 
purposes in San Fernando Valley. Respondents filed an appli-
cation for a zoning variance with the zoning administrator 
to permit construction of a motel complex, including restau-
rant, coffee shop, cocktail lounge, and automobile service 
station. The zoning administrator denied respondent's appli-
cation for a variance. 
16. 262 Cal. App.2d 279, 68 Cal. 17. 262 Cal. App.2d 1, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 505 (1968). 320 (1968). 
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The city charter authorized the zoning administrator to 
grant a variance, provided that he make 4 enumerated findings 
in writing.1s Additionally, the charter empowered a board 
of zoning adjustment to hear and determine appeals from 
rulings of the zoning administrator, subject to the same re-
quirements with respect to findings. In considering an appeal 
from a ruling of the administrator, the board requested its 
secretary to prepare findings, which were to be presented at 
a future board meeting for granting the appeal and to set 
forth the conditions as shown in the record. The secretary 
prepared the necessary findings for granting the appeal, but 
the findings were never adopted by the board. At a later 
meeting, additional testimony was taken on the appeal; after 
a motion was made and seconded to grant the appeal, it failed 
to pass. 
The lower court issued a peremptory writ of mandate com-
pelling the board to execute, file, and distribute its findings 
as prepared by the secretary. The appellate court reversed, 
pointing out that even assuming the board intended to grant 
the variance, mandate was not the proper remedy, for the 
board failed to comply with the statutory requirements-the 
formalization of the findings required for grant of a variance. 
Again, the court asserted that where findings are required 
before the issuance of a conditional use permit or variance, 
they must be made. 
In Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Manufacturing Company v. 
County of San Joaquin,19 a use permit was conditioned upon 
the applicant conveying certain property to the county for 
18. Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 274, § 98, 
pp. 4676-4677. The findings are (a) 
that the strict application of the zoning 
regulations or requirements would result 
in practical difficulties or unnecessary 
hardships inconsistent with the general 
purposes and intent of the regulations, 
(b) that there are exceptional circum-
stances or conditions applicable to the 
property involved or to the intended use 
or development of the property that do 
not generally apply to other property 
12 
in the same zone or neighborhood, (c) 
that the granting of a variance will not 
be materially detrimental to the public 
welfare or injurious to property or im-
provements in such zone or neighbor-
hood in which the property is located. 
(d) that the granting of a variance will 
not be contrary to the objectives of 
the Master Plan. 
19. 257 Cal. App.2d 181, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 37 (1967). 
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construction of a road. The basis for the condition was that 
if the use permit was granted, it would substantially increase 
the vehicular traffic and thereby necessitate a road. At the 
trial no testimony was taken: the trial judge relied solely on 
the evidence introduced before the planning commission. The 
judge determined that traffic would be increased and therefore 
concluded that the condition was valid. The appellate court, 
in reviewing the record, found no evidence that there would 
be any appreciable increase in traffic and held that the condi-
tion was arbitrary and not a legitimate exercise of police 
power. Citing Gong v. City of Fremont,20 the court recog-
nized that conditions may be imposed on the grant of a use 
permit, and that the courts have no authority to interfere with 
the denial of a variance or use permit except on a clear, con-
vincing showing of fraud, illegality, or abuse of discretion. 
Nevertheless, it thought the lower court had abused its dis-
cretion. The appellate court's ruling is interesting in that 
it reversed the judgment with directions to the trial court to 
issue a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the defendant 
county to issue the use permit without the invalid conditions 
rather than directing the trial court to take evidence on the 
question of increased traffic flow and the necessity of con-
structing a road. In effect, the appellate court ruled on the 
factual issue of whether the permit would result in an increase 
in traffic and concluded that it would not and that nothing 




Although a male teacher has the constitutional right to wear 
a beard/ the court in Akin v. Riverside Unified School District 
Board of Education2 held that this right does not extend to 
20. 250 Cal. App.2d 568, 58 Cal. of Education, 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 
Rptr. 664 (1967). Discussed in Cal. Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967). 
Law-Trends and Del'elopments (1967) 2. 262 Cal. App.2d 161, 68 Cal. 
at p. 445. Rptr. 557 (1968). 
1. See Finot v. Pasadena City Board 
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male high school students. The court cited the criteria estab-
lished in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District,3 
as necessary to allow a governmental agency to impose restric-
tions on the exercise of an individual's constitutional rights. 
As stated in Bagley, the governmental agency must show the 
following: (1) the government's restraint rationally relates 
to the enhancement of the public service; (2) the benefits 
the public gains by the restraint outweigh the resulting impair-
ment of the constitutional right; (3) no alternative less sub-
versive of the constitutional right is available. After reviewing 
the testimony introduced at the trial, the court held that 
in applying the Bagley formula, an "alternative less subver-
sive" of the petitioner's right to grow a beard did not appear 
to be available. The evidence upon which the court relied 
tended to show that the wearing of mustaches, by male stu-
dents had a disruptive influence in the educational process. In 
addition, the improved educational atmosphere created by an 
absence of beards was thought to outweigh by far the restraint 
on the "peripheral right" to grow a beard. Confronted with 
this evidence, the court concluded the school board had no 
other course available. 
Liability of Public Entities or Agencies 
Filing of Claims 
In Fonseca v. City of Santa Clara,4 plaintiff argued that a 
minor's cause of action arising in 1950, not recognized at 
that time because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity exist-
ing prior to the decision of Muskopf v. Corning Hospital 
District,5 could not fall within the provisions of the claim stat-
utes then in effect. Plaintiff filed her complaint in September, 
1964, for an injury that occurred in July, 1950, when she was 
a minor. In July, 1964, a claim was filed with the County 
of Santa Clara. It was denied in August. The county relied 
3. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 4. 263 Cal. App.2d 257, 69 Cal. 
421 P.2d 409 (1966). Discussed in Cal. Rptr. 357 (1968). 
Law-Trends and Developments 5. 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 
(1967) at pp. 338-342, 438. 359 P.2d 457 (1961) modified on other 
grounds 57 C.2d 488. 
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on the provisions of sections 29700 et seq. of the Govern-
ment Code, as those sections existed in 1950, to support the 
contention that a claim had to be filed. The court held that 
the action was barred because no claim was filed pursuant to 
provisions of the Code as they existed in 1950 and because 
there was nothing in subsequent legislation or in court deci-
sions that would relieve the plaintiff from failure to file such 
a claim. The court noted that even a minor must present a 
claim within the period provided by law as a condition prece-
dent to the accrual of a cause of action, citing Williams v. 
Los Angeles Transit Authority.6 
A government entity's notice or knowledge of an accident 
does not excuse the failure of the claimant to file a timely claim 
as required by statute. Still, a claimant might assert estoppel 
as an excuse. In this connection, the court, in Petersen v. 
City of Vallejo,7 held that in order to claim estoppel as an 
excuse for the failure to file a claim, there must be some 
affirmative representation or act by the public agency inducing 
reliance by the claimant. 
Filing of Complaints 
Section 945.6 of the Government Code provides that any 
suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for 
which a claim must be presented should be commenced within 
6 months after the date the claim was acted upon or was 
deemed to have been rejected by the public entity. Although 
the parties in Isaacson v. City of Oakland8 negotiated for a 
settlement, no compromise settlement was made. The trial 
court thought that the city had compromised the claim pursu-
ant to the provisions of section 912.6 (a)(4).9 It reasoned 
that since negotiation is necessary to compromise, the city, 
by negotiating, was compromising the claim pursuant to sec-
6. 68 Cal.2d 599, 68 Cal. Rptr. 297, 9. § 912.6(a)(4), providing that if 
440 P.2d 497 (1968). legal liability of the public entity or 
7. 259 Cal. App. 2d 757, 66 Cal. the amount justly due is disputed, the 
Rptr. 776 (1968). board may reject or compromise the 
8. 263 Cal. App.2d 414, 69 Cal. claim. 
Rptr. 379 (1968). 
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tion 912.6. The court concluded that the claim must be 
deemed rejected when the negotiations ended and that the 
filing of the complaint was therefore timely. The court found, 
however, that section 912.6 cannot properly be construed as 
equating negotiation with compromise and in the absence of 
a written agreement extending the time to act on a claim, 
the statute of limitations commences to run not later than 
45 days after the filing of the claim. 
In Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity,lO the plaintiff, a minor, filed a timely claim with the de-
fendant, who rejected it. He filed complaint over six months 
after the rejection. Section 945.6 of the Government Code, 
as it then read, required that suit be commenced within 
6 months after a claim was rejected or deemed rejected by 
inaction of the governing board. The supreme court held 
that section 352 of the Code of Civil Procedurell preserves 
causes of actions of minors against the running of the statute 
of limitations and that nothing in section 945.6 abrogates 
that section or the public policy underlying it. The court 
concluded that a minor is required to file a claim with the 
public agency within the specified time requirements, but is 
not required to file suit within the limitation period provided 
by section 945.6. 
When a complaint against a public employee is filed in a 
federal court sitting in the State of California, the complaint 
must allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act.12 
The court in Williams v. Townsend/3 asserted it to be a well 
established rule that where Congress failed to provide a 
period of limitations within which an action must be brought 
10. 68 Cal.2d 599, 68 Cal. Rptr. 297, 
440 P.2d 497 (1968). 
11. § 352. Exception, as to persons 
under disabilities. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, 
mentioned in chapter three of this title, 
be, at the time the cause of action ac-
crued, either: 
1: Under the age of majority; or, 
2. Insane; or, 
3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge, 
or in execution under the sentence of a 
criminal court for a term less than for 
life; or, 
4. A married woman, and her hus-
band be a necessary party with her in 
commencing such action; 
the time of such disability is not a 
part of the time limited for the com-
mencement of the action. 
12. Gov. Code § 950.2. 
13. 283 F.Supp. 580 (D.C. [1968]). 
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under the Federal Civil Rights Act,14 the statute of limitations 
of the state where the cause of action arose is applied. 
Estoppel 
In Denham v. County of Los Angeles/5 a claim was filed 
with the board of supervisors on November 16, 1964. The 
board argued that the claim should have been "deemed re~ 
jected" on December 31, 1964 (45 days after the claim was 
filed) by virtue of section 912.4 of the Government Code. l6 
However, the board, on January 12, 1965, denied the claim 
and advised the defendant of this action by letter. The 
plaintiff thereupon filed his complaint. The county contended 
that the plaintiff was 9 days too late and the trial court agreed 
with this contention. The appellate court, in reversing the 
judgment and order of dismissal, pointed out that the board 
of supervisors, in reconsidering the claim on January 12, 1965, 
manifested an intent to waive its right to stand on a rejection 
by operation of law and an intent to rely on its later affirm-
ative order of rejection. The court pointed out that the 
county embarked upon a course of conduct entirely incon-
sistent with treating the claim as rejected by inaction and 
thereby brought into play elements necessary to create an 
14. 18 V.S.C.A. §§ 837, 1509, 20 
V.S.C.A. §§ 241, 640, 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 
1971, 1974-1974e, 1975d. 
15. 259 Cal. App.2d 860, 66 Cal. 
R ptr. 922 (1968). 
16. § 912.4 Board's action on claim: 
Time. 
(a) The board shall act on a claim 
in the manner provided in section 912.6 
or 912.8 within 45 days after the claim 
has been presented. If a claim is 
amended, the board shall act on the 
amended claim within 45 days after the 
amended claim is presented. 
(b) The claimant and the board may 
extend the period within which the 
board is required to act on the claim 
by written agreement made: 
(I) Before the expiration of such 
period; or 
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(2) After the expiration of such pe-
riod if an action based on the claim has 
not been commenced and is not yet 
barred by the period of limitations pro-
vided in section 945.6. 
(c) If the board fails or refuses to 
act on a claim within the time pre-
scribed by this section, the claim shall 
be deemed to have been rejected by the 
board on the last day of the period 
within which the board was required 
to act upon the claim. If the period 
within which the board is required to 
act is extended by agreement pursuant 
to this section, whether made before 
or after the expiration of such period, 
the last day of the period within which 
the board is required to act shall be 
the last day of the period specified in 
such agreement. 
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equitable estoppel. Citing Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles,17 
the court set forth the four elements necessary for applying 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped 
must be apprised of the facts, (2) he must intend that his 
conduct shall be acted upon or so act that the party asserting 
the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended, (3) the 
other party must be ignorant of the true facts, and (4) he 
must rely upon the conduct to his injury. The court in 
Denham found that these four elements were proven by the 
plaintiff. 
Liability for Dangerous Condition of Public Property 
Unless a public agency has the legal authority to remedy 
a dangerous condition, it cannot be held liable for injuries 
caused by the condition. In Avey v. County of Santa Clara/8 
plaintiffs argued that the county should have installed a bar-
ricade to prevent children crossing from a bus stop to a store 
on the opposite side of 2 highways. The highways were 
separated by an island; one was owned by the state and the 
other by the defendant county. Plaintiffs contended that the 
dangerous condition was not limited to state property. The 
court held against the plaintiffs because they did not point 
out the type of barricade that was necessary and that would 
not interfere with the public right to enter the store, park 
vehicles, and use the adjacent curbs and sidewalk. The court 
concluded that section 835 of the Government Code19 did 
not require the barricade. 
17. 67 Cal.2d 297, 61 Cal. Rptr. 661, 
431 P.2d 245 (1967). 
18. 257 Cal. App.2d 708, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 181 (1968). 
19. § 835. When public entity liable 
for injury caused by dangerous condi-
tion of property: Requisite showing by 
plaintiff: Employee's negligent or 
wrongful act: Actual or constructive 
notice. 
Except as provided by statute, a pub-
lic entity is liable for injury caused by 
a dangerous condition of its property if 
the plaintiff establishes that the prop-
erty was in a dangerous condition at the 
time of the injury, that the injury was 
proximately caused by the dangerous 
condition, that the dangerous condition 
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of 
the kind of injury which was incurred, 
and that either: 
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of an employee of the public 
entity within the scope of his employ-
ment created the dangerous condition; 
or 
(b) The public entity had actual or 
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Another contention by the plaintiffs was that the defendants 
should have sought the state's consent to remove or shorten 
obscuring foliage on the island. The court answered this 
contention by saying that defendant's failure to ask the state 
for permission was not a breach of duty because it was under 
no duty to correct the condition. 
In Holmes v. City of Oakland,20 the court reversed a judg-
ment of dismissal after a demurrer was sustained without leave 
to amend. The court held that a cause of action was stated 
where it was alleged that an unguarded railroad operation on 
a city street near a grammar school created a substantial risk 
of injury to children using the street. The court determined 
that the railroad crossing was under the control of the city, 
thereby distinguishing the A vey case. 
The court in Drummond v. City of Redondo Beach/ held 
that a defect in a public street located off the usually traveled 
portions of a highway is not a condition that may be consid-
ered "dangerous" under the definition of that term found in 
section 830(a) of the Government Code. 2 
Discretionary Immunity 
During the investigation of an automobile accident, a 
police officer employed by the City of Los Angeles and, at 
the officer's request the plaintiff, were in the middle of an 
intersection looking for skidmarks and other physical evidence 
when they were struck by an automobile. The city, in Mc-
Corkle v. City of Los Angeles,3 appealed from an adverse 
judgment. It contended that the police officer was perform-
constructive notice of the dangerous 
condition under section 835.2 a suffi-
cient time prior to the injury to have 
taken measures to protect against the 
dangerous condition. 
20. 260 Cal. App.2d 378, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 197 (1968). 
1. 255 Cal. App.2d 715, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
497 (1967). 
2. § 830. "Dangerous condition": 
"Protect against": "Property of a pub-
lic entity" and "public property." 
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As used in this chapter: 
(a)"Dangerous condition" means a 
condition of property that creates a 
substantial (as distinguished from a 
minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of 
injury when such property or adjacent 
property is used with due care in a 
manner in which it is reasonably fore-
seeable that it will be used. 
3. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 1 Cal. Rptr. 
331 (1968). 
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ing a discretionary act, namely, the investigation of an auto-
mobile accident, and argued that section 820.24 of the Gov-
ernment Code exonerated the city from liability. The court 
pointed out that an act is ministerial if it consists only of 
obedience to orders or the performance of a duty in which 
the officer is left no choice of his own, and that an act is 
discretionary if it requires personal deliberation, decision 
and judgment. In citing Sava v. Fuller,5 the court reasoned 
that classifying an act of a public employee as discretionary 
does not produce immunity if the injury results not from 
the employee's exercise of discretion vested in him to under-
take the act, but from his negligence in performing the act 
after having made the discretionary decision to do so. Since 
the officer was negligent after the exercise of his discretion 
to investigate the accident, he was not immune from liability 
under section 820.2. Consequently, the city was not immune 
under section 815.2(b).6 
In Johnson v. State of California,7 plaintiff was assaulted 
by a boy released from the California Youth Authority to 
live in the plaintiff's foster home. The defendant knew that 
the boy had homicidal tendencies and a background of vio-
lence but did not disclose these facts to the plaintiff. The 
court held that the decision to parole the particular youth 
and the selection of a foster home are matters falling within 
the discretionary immunity section of the Government Code. 
It follows, the court stated, that the decision not to inform 
a prospective foster parent of certain tendencies of the ward 
must also be sheltered by immunity. The court reasoned that 
if homicidal tendencies must be disclosed, it might be impos-
sible to draw the line between violent tendencies and others 
that might be of interest to prospective parents. The court 
4. § 820.2 When employee not lia-
ble: Exercise of discretion. 
Except as otherwise provided by stat-
ute, a public employee is not liable for 
an injury resulting from his act or 
omission where the act or omission was 
the result of the exercise of the discre-
tion vested in him, whether or not such 
discretion be abused. 
5. 249 Cal. App.2d 281, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 312 (1967). 
6. See also Widdows v. Koch, 263 
Cal. App.2d 228, 69 Cal. Rptr. 464 
(1968), for a further discussion of dis-
cretionary and ministerial acts. 
7. 258 Cal. App.2d 65, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
717 (1968) hearing granted 258 A.C.A. 
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also pointed out that every decision to parole and place a 
parolee in a home could possibly result in a law suit if the 
court should hold to the contrary. 
Liability for Acts of Independent Contractors 
In Van Arsdale v. Hollinger,S an independent contractor 
violated his contract with the city by failing to construct 
barricades and warning devices on a street reconstruction 
project. The primary issue was the city's liability to a person 
injured as a result of this failure. The court found the answer 
in the tort liability provisions of section 815.4 of the Govern-
ment Code,9 in spite of the city's contractual delegation of 
responsibility. The court ruled that the undisputed facts 
showed that a risk of physical harm was likely without the 
safety precautions and concluded that this likelihood imposed 
on the city a nondelegable duty of care. 
Eminent Domain 
Inverse Condemnation 
In Sutfin v. State of California, 10.11 the court was faced 
with the question of whether damage to personal property 
was compensable on the theory of inverse condemnation 
where flooding had occurred from waters controlled by a flood 
control district and caused damage to automobiles owned by 
plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that the damage to his 
personal property was compensable under Article I, Section 
14 of the State Constitution, which provides, in part, ". 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation having first been made to, or 
353. See 69 Cal.2d -, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
240,447 P.2d 352 (69 A.c. 813) (1968). 
8. 68 CaI.2d 245, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20, 
437 P.2d 508 (1968). 
9. § 815.4 Same: Tortious act or 
omission of independent contractor: 
Limitation. 
A public entity is liable for injury 
proximately caused by a tortious act or 
omission of an independent contractor 
of the public entity to the same extent 
186 CAL LAW 1969 
that the public entity would be subject 
to such liability if it were a private 
person. Nothing in this section subjects 
a public entity to liability for the act 
or omission of an independent con-
tractor if the public entity would not 
have been liable for the injury had the 
act or omission been that of an em-
ployee of the public entity. 
10,11. 261 Cal. App.2d 50, 67, Cal. 
Rptr. 665 (1968). 
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paid into court for the owner . . .". The plaintiff argued 
that the phrase "public use" referred not to the property 
taken or damaged, but to the public project that caused the 
damage. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the 
trial court and allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint to 
determine if a cause of action in inverse condemnation could 
be stated. The court noted that in proper cases, there may 
be recovery for the taking or damaging of private property 
for public use whether the property is real or personal, stating 
that it was immaterial whether the property had been devoted 
to a public use. The distinction appears to be that in order 
to collect damages under inverse condemnation, it is necessary 
to show that the damage resulted from an inherent danger in 
the public operation (i.e., flooding, in this case) rather than 
as a result of negligence in the operation of a public project. 
In Colberg, Inc. v. State of California Ex Rei. Department 
of Public Works/2 the state proposed to build twin low-level 
freeway bridges across the mouth of an inlet that provided 
access between the Stockton Deep Water Channel and plain-
tiff's shipyards in the Upper Stockton Channel. The vertical 
clearance of these bridges would be approximately 45 feet 
above the water line. The plaintiff alleged that about 81 
percent of its business involved ships standing more than 45 
feet above the water line, and that the present minimum clear-
ance between his shipyards and the Pacific Ocean is 135 feet, 
established by the Antioch Bridge. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that 
the impairment of access to the plaintiff's shipyards was not 
a "taking" or "damaging" of plaintiff's private property for 
which compensation was required within the meaning of Ar-
ticle I, Section 14 of the California Constitution. The court 
pointed out that the state, as owner of its navigable waterways, 
may act relative to those waterways in any manner consistent 
with the improvement of commerce and navigation. If the 
property of a private owner is consequently injured, the prop-
12. 67 Cal.2d 408, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 
432 P.2d 3 (1967), cert. den. 390 U.S. 
949, 19 L.Ed.2d 1139, 88 S.C!. 1037. 
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erty owner must, for the sake of the general welfare, yield with 
uncompensated obedience. 
Justice Peters, joined by Justice Mosk, dissented with the 
contention that plaintiff's rights were substantially, not just 
technically, impaired and that the impairment was caused 
by the state not strictly to aid navigation but to improve a 
freeway and subsequent auto travel. It was pointed out in 
the dissent that had the freeway construction impaired land 
access to the same degree, such impairment would be com-
pensable. The dissent reasoned that where the use by the 
state is not strictly for navigational purposes but, as here, for 
freeway purposes, the policies of compensation declared in 
the land access cases should apply. 
Disputed Ownership 
In an unusual situation where condemnor and condemnee 
both claimed title to land sought to be condemned, the court 
in People Ex Rei. Department of Public Works v. Shasta Pipe 
& Supply Company,13 held that the rule set forth in City of 
Los Angeles v. Pomeroy14 requires the condemnor to prove 
what its interest is in the property it seeks to condemn. The 
court found that the plaintiff had failed to set forth the 
nature and extent of its claim of ownership and that, assuming 
the defendants had satisfied this initial requirement by showing 
their color of title, payment of taxes, etc., the burden of going 
forward then shifted to the plaintiff and made it necessary for 
him to show the nature of his title. A new trial was ordered 
because the condemnor had failed to produce satisfactory 
evidence of title and the trial court had merely assumed that 
the condemnor owned the property in dispute. 
Compensation 
In City of Los Angeles v. Allen's Grocery Company, Inc.,15 
13. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 15. 265 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr. 
618 (1968). 88 (1968), 
14. 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1899), 
err. dismd. 188 U.S. 314, 47 L.Ed. 
487, 23 S.C!. 395. 
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the court affirmed the well established rule that the condemnor 
need only pay compensation for the property taken and not 
for every loss the condemnee may suffer as a result of the 
taking. The city sought to condemn property which the 
defendant had leased and was using as a grocery store. After 
some negotiations, the defendant gave the keys of the premises 
to the city but refused to move any removable items from the 
store. Defendant claimed damages for personal property on 
the ground that the city, by taking the real property and the 
attached fixtures, had forced him out of business and had 
consequently condemned the entire business. The court held 
that the city had condemned only the real property and that 
the loss of real property did not compel compensation for the 
stock in trade. 
In City of Whittier v. Aramian/6 the court was faced with 
the question of whether a dismissal of a condemnation suit 
by the condemnor was equivalent to an abandonment under 
section 1255a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which entitles 
defendants to their costs and attorneys' fees if an action in 
eminent domain is abandoned. Although the city was justified 
in this case, because of lack of funds, in dismissing the con-
demnation action, the court held that the dismissal constituted 
a voluntary abandonment even though the city expected to 
proceed with condemnation action at a future date. 
Does the taking of property for an economic purpose violate 
Article I, Section 14 of the California Constitution on the 
basis that such a taking would not be for a "public use"? In 
People Ex ReI. Department of Public Works v. Superior 
Court,17 the Department of Public Works required .65 acres 
of land for the construction of a freeway and brought an 
action in mandamus to compel the Superior Court to proceed 
with the condemnation of the parcel in question. This small 
portion was so located that 54 acres would be landlocked 
by the taking. The department argued that it should be 
allowed to condemn the entire parcel so the landowner would 
receive full value for the property and the risk of excessive sev-
16. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 17. 68 Ca1.2d 206, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342, 
805 (1968), 436 P .2d 342 (1968). 
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erance damages would be avoided. Although the department 
conceded that the 54 acres were not necessary for the con-
struction of the freeway, it argued that this acreage could be 
sold to reduce the total cost of the freeway project. In a 
split decision, the court held that section 104.1 of the Streets 
and Highways Code18 authorized the condemnation of the 54 
acre parcel. But it qualified the holding by stating that if 
the trial court should find the taking not justified to avoid 
excessive severance or consequential damages, then the taking 
would not be proper under the cited authority. 
In dissenting, Justice Mosk, with whom Justice Peters 
concurred, stated, "Whenever an illustration of the voracious 
appetite of acquisitive government is desired, the action of 
the public agency here will serve as exhibit 'A'." 
18. § 104.1 Same: Taking whole 
parcel and sale or exchange of unneeded 
remnant. 
Wherever a part of a parcel of land 
is to be taken for state highway pur-
poses and the remainder is to be left in 
such shape or condition as to be of little 
190 CAL LAW 1969 
value to its owner, or to give rise to 
claims or litigation concerning severance 
or other damage, the department may 
acquire the whole parcel and may sell 
the remainder or may exchange the 
same for other property needed for 
state highway purposes. 
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